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A range of alternative empirical definitions of informal activity have been employed in the 
literature. Choice of definition is often dictated by data availability. Different definitions may 
imply very different conceptual understandings of informality. In this paper, Henley, 
Arabsheibani, and Carneiro investigate the degree of congruence between three definitions of 
informality based on employment contract registration, social security protection and the 
characteristics of the employer and employment using Brazilian household survey data for the 
period 1992 to 2001. 64% of the economically active are informal according to at least one 
definition, but only 40% are informal according to all three. Steady compositional changes have 
been taking place among informal workers, conditional on definition. The econometric analysis 
undertaken by the authors reveals that the conditional impact of particular factors (demographic, 
educational attainment, family circumstances) on the likelihood of informality varies 
considerably from one definition to another. Their results suggest growing heterogeneity within 
the informal sector. Therefore, the authors argue that informal activity may be as much 
associated with entrepreneurial dynamism as with any desire to avoid costly contract registration 
and social protection. However, this paper confirms that there is no a priori reason for 
entrepreneurial activity to be unprotected. Consequently definitions of informality based on 
occupation and employer size seem the most arbitrary in practice even if conceptually well-
founded. 
    3




  The growth and scale of informal employment in many developing countries has been 
traditionally attributed to the displacement of workers into insecure forms of labor market 
attachment as the only feasible alternative to unemployment (Fields, 1975; Mazumdar, 1976).
1 
More recently a number of authors (Pradhan and van Soest, 1995, 1997; Cohen and House, 1996; 
Marcoullier et al., 1997; Maloney, 1999; Saavedra and Chong, 1999; Gong and van Soest, 2002) 
question this interpretation of informality, by calling into doubt the idea that the existence of 
informal and formal sectors is a manifestation of “dualism” in the labor market. A further strand 
of research has highlighted the dynamic “micro-entrepreneurial” nature of informal economic 
activity (Cunningham and Maloney, 2001; Maloney, 2004; Pisani and Pagan, 2004). This view 
of informality is well-established and can be traced back to the work of Hart (1972). A final view 
(and one which we do not address in the present paper) concerns the relationship between 
informality and illegal or tax-evading activity (see Gerxhani, 2004, and Loayza et al., 2005).
2 
Each of these alternative views shares in common the idea that informal activity may be freely 
chosen by some workers. These individuals either perceive state social protection to be poor 
“value for money” or do not wish to have the conditions of their employment relationship (such 
as hours of work) restricted by tight state labor market regulation. Alternatively they may be 
attracted by the prospective job satisfaction or income stream associated with a successful 
transition into entrepreneurship, or may perceive the relative benefits of illegal or unregistered 
activity to outweigh the risks of detection.   4
 
  The size of the informal sector is of particular interest to economic policy makers 
concerned to promote the development of a micro-entrepreneurial sector. This concern arises 
because of its perceived contribution to dynamic economic efficiency, possibly as a response to 
growing competitive pressures brought about by trade liberalization. On the other hand policy 
makers may be concerned that significant numbers, perhaps even a majority of workers in 
developing countries, have little or no social security provision. This means that they have little 
on which to fall back in the event of illness, unemployment or old age, beyond personal wealth 
and extended family support. A narrower but nevertheless important concern may be to reduce 
informality in order to widen the base of direct taxation. 
 
  This discussion of alternative perspectives on informality brings into sharp focus the 
question of the most appropriate way to define and measure the informal sector. This is a 
question which has attracted little or no detailed attention in the literature. The purpose of the 
present paper is to attempt to redress this. This lack of attention may arise from the paucity of 
data on a sector which by its nature is problematic to define. Thus researchers tend to fall back 
on the pragmatic and judicial use of data on employment status and sectoral affiliation. There is 
little discussion of the sensitivity of any conclusions drawn to issues of measurement and 
definition. An implicit assumption is that international comparisons of the scale of informality, 
which may be based on very different empirical definitions, are valid. Over the last 20 years or 
so the growing availability of household and living standards surveys has improved the evidence 
base for many developing economies. However such surveys are typically not sufficiently rich to 
permit an evaluation of alternative definitions of informality.   5
 
  Household survey data available for Brazil is a notable exception to this. Large scale 
annual household surveys contain detailed information on individual household member 
economic status (the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios or PNAD). They permit 
some comparison of alternative informality definitions. Firstly individual informality can be 
examined at the level of employer compliance with state labor market regulation through the 
possession of a registered labor contract (signed labor card). Secondly informality can be 
examined at the level of individual social protection coverage, through membership of a social 
security institute. Finally informality can be examined, as it is in many studies for which 
information on contract registration and social protection coverage is non-existent, by addressing 
the scale of micro-entrepreneurship activity. In practice this means an examination of individual 
employment status (type of employment or self-employment) combined with information, if 
employed or an employer, on the sector and scale of the business activity. 
 
  A comparative descriptive investigation of the sets of individuals defined as informal 
according to these different definitions reveals some substantial similarities, such as in 
demographic and educational status. However, a multivariate (probit) analysis reveals that some 
characteristics are more strongly associated with one measure of informality than another. For 
example, educational attainment is far more strongly associated with social security institute 
membership, and with informality defined according to employment status and activity than it is 
with the measure of informality based on compliance with labor regulation. On the other hand 
social security institute membership appears to be less strongly associated with the demographic 
and informal status of others within the household.   6
 
  So the main conclusion to be drawn from this research is that the precise definition of 
informality does matter. It cannot be assumed that alternative definitions are broadly consistent, 
and that the conclusions drawn from any detailed analysis or modeling of informality will be 
robust to definitional choice. This is particularly important given recent developments in the 
debate on the subject. Any particular choice of definition or measurement may be conditioned by 
a priori perspectives or hypotheses about the nature and role of the informal sector. 
 
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a more detailed 
discussion of the existing literature and in particular on the way in which informality has been 
defined and measured. Section 3 discusses the Brazilian data source used and the different 
measures of informality which are analyzed. Section 4 provides some descriptive analysis and 
discussion of these measures. Section 5 documents a multivariate analysis to investigate 
commonalities and differences in the way in which the different indicators of informality are 
associated with demographic, employment and household characteristics. Section 6 provides a 
concluding discussion. 
 
2. Defining Informality 
 
The practice of defining informality in terms of the economic status of the individual 
(self-employed or own-account worker, domestic worker, small scale employer etc.) in 
conjunction with the characteristics of the employer (small scale, no collective bargaining etc.) is 
well-established in the literature. A substantial number of early analyses of informality simply   7
assume that the informal sector corresponds to sole-traders (own account workers) and those in 
small or micro enterprises. “Small” or “micro” is defined arbitrarily and may depend on 
questionnaire design. For example, from recent research which makes use of such a definition of 
informality, Prahan and van Soest (1995, 1997) and Maloney (1999) use a definition of fewer 
than six employees for Bolivia and Mexico respectively; Funkhouser (1996) uses fewer than five 
employees for an analysis of five Central American economies; Marcoullier et al. (1997) use 
fewer than six for Mexico and Peru; Cohen and House (1996) use fewer than 20 for Sudan; 
Livingstone (1991) uses fewer than 10 for Kenya.  Galli and Kucera (2004) undertake an 
international comparative study across 14 Latin America countries. They employ a definition 
adopted by the ILO based on employees in firms of either fewer than 5 or 10 employees 
(depending on the country). Comparability is compromised because of limited detailed 
information on the size distribution of firms. 
 
Where authors have been particularly concerned to highlight the role of informality in 
promoting entrepreneurship this definitional approach has been explicitly preferred over 
alternatives. However the attractiveness of defining informality as equivalent to the 
“entrepreneurial” sector side-steps the important conceptual question of how large does an 
establishment have to become for it to cease to be part of the dynamic, entrepreneurial sector. 
Some authors have introduced a further distinction into the definition of the informal sector by 
including some industrial activities and excluding others (most notably professional service 
activities). A shortcoming of this approach is that it excludes the possibility, even if it is an 
unlikely one, that some employees in small establishments may have contracts of employment 
which conform to labor market regulations and may contribute to social insurance schemes. It   8
also excludes the possibility that some large private sector employers may not provide registered 
employment contracts or encourage employee contributions to social insurance schemes. Similar 
objections might apply to domestic and temporary workers who are often entirely classified as 
informal. 
 
The economic significance attached to whether an employment relationship conforms to 
state labor contracting regulations depends on the degree to which those regulations impart 
inflexibility in the extent to which both parties can tailor the terms and conditions of employment 
to their best advantage. So, for example, if regulations permit flexible hours of work with no 
effective upper constraint then the economic impact of signing a formal contract compared to 
working informally may be less, and the rationality for participating in the informal sector 
reduced. The existence of significant lay-off costs if a formal contract is terminated may be one 
of the main factors pushing employers towards offering informal employment (see World Bank, 
2002 on the case of Brazil). 
 
The argument that both employees and employers may prefer to enter into either 
unregistered or registered employment relationships will hinge on the balance of the advantages 
and disadvantages. This is the central argument behind recent work (such as Maloney 2004) 
which rejects the traditional view that the informal sector is a labor market segment populated by 
displaced workers queuing for good jobs in the rationed formal sector. Perhaps the most 
persuasive evidence in support of this is in Maloney (1999). He uses Mexican panel data to 
examine between-sector and within-sector transitions. The definition of informality used in this 
research is based on establishment size rather than contract status. However no evidence is found   9
to support the proposition that those newly entering informal employment are more likely to be 
young, displaced workers waiting for better jobs. So contract status should provide a good 
discriminator for informal status if the allocation of workers to the informal sector is governed 
by a free assessment of the costs and benefits of labor contract registration. Informality should 
therefore be defined not according to the nature of the job or the employer but according to the 
worker’s legal status. But in practice the informal sector may exist for a complicated mix of 
reasons. Some workers may choose to be there because jobs are more flexible or because self-
employment is more attractive whereas others may be displaced involuntarily into the sector. 
 
The practical problem with defining informality in terms of illegal employment is that 
data may simply not exist on contract status. This is particularly so if the employee does not 
know for certain whether the employer is conforming to employment regulations, something that 
might be more likely in the case of temporary workers. For the self-employed or for own-account 
agricultural workers such a definition may have no relevance since an own-account worker 
cannot contract with themselves. In some countries, of which Brazil is a notable example, 
employers are required to indicate to workers that the employment relationship is legally 
registered. So a third party such as a statistical agency can establish this with a reasonable degree 
of accuracy. It therefore follows that the informal sector in Brazil has attracted particular 
attention from researchers. 
 
Where information on contract status is not available or relevant, the principal alternative 
definition of informality is one defined by social protection status. The paper that is widely 
regarded as the seminal empirical study of the informal sector (Merrick, 1976) employs this   10
definition. Merrick’s study is of the urban labor market of Belo Horizonte in central eastern 
Brazil. For employed workers informality is defined by the lack of membership of a social 
security institute. Subsequent work which has adopted the criterion of no social protection or 
non-payment of social security taxes for distinguishing informal employees includes Portes et al. 
(1986), Marcouiller et al. (1997), Maloney (1999) and Saavedra and Chong (1999). Absence of 
social protection is regarded as an important indicator of informality, focusing attention on the 
potential costs of informality to employees in the event of adverse economic circumstances. The 
consequences of informality so defined may depend on the economic position of the individual 
within the household: that is whether they are the main or secondary earner. It may also depend 
on or the social protection status of other household members. This definition also focuses 
attention on the inefficiency of social protection systems as a possible driver of the growth in 
informality. However typical household or individual surveys used to investigate informality 
may not provide information on the social security status of the self-employed or small 
employer. So studies often rely on a “hybrid” definition of informality in which employees are 
classified according to social security status. Own-account workers are classified as entirely 
informal and employers classified according to either or both the size of their business (number 
of employees) or the activity of the business. 
 
A small number of previous studies have investigated the sensitivity of measured rates of 
informality to choice of definition. Marcouiller et al. (1997) compare the size of the informal 
sectors in El Salvador, Peru and Mexico using definitions based on firm-size
3 and on non-
payment of social security taxes. The latter definition produces a considerably higher estimate of 
the size of the informal sector (43.2% compared to 30.8% of workers in the case of Mexico in   11
1990). However, depending on country, between 89 and 97% of the self-employed and small-
firm employees do not pay social security taxes. This definition is preferred for the econometric 
analysis of the wage differential between the two sectors because it is more comprehensive. 
Saavedra and Chong (1999) similarly find the informal sector to be larger when defined 
according to social security coverage rather than firm size (54.8% compared to 53.3% in Peru in 
1995). Although this difference is not as great as in the Marcouiller et al. study, the two 
definitions in this case display substantially different trend and cyclical behavior. The authors 
take the view that the social security definition is more useful because it shows informality 
falling with economic growth around a counter-cyclical movement. They use this definition in 
subsequent analysis of the earnings differential between the two sectors. 
 
A third more recent paper, Gong et al. (2000), examines the scale of informality in 
Mexico over the period 1992 to 1995 using various definitions. Defining informality according 
to job type (self-employed plus piece-rate workers) provides an estimate of 37.6% for the rate of 
informality. Defining informality according to firm size (less than six employees) provides an 
estimate of 30.4%. 89% of informal workers according to either definition have no social 
security coverage, whereas only 26.2% and 19.2% of those classified as formal under the job 
type and firm size definitions respectively had no social security coverage. In subsequent 
econometric work on sector transitions (Gong and van Soest, 2002) the job type definition is 
preferred.
4 These findings tend to suggest that there is varying correspondence between 
alternative definitions of informality. It would therefore be surprising if econometric analyses 
modeling allocation between sectors or sector earnings differentials were robust to choice of 
definition.   12
 
3. Measuring Informality in Brazil 
 
  Many commentators express a belief that the informal sector in Brazil is large and 
growing, despite trade liberalization and successful macroeconomic stabilization over the last 15 
years. For example, Carneiro (1997) reports that, although in the late 1980s the Brazilian 
economy appeared to stagnate, unemployment rates remained low and total employment (formal 
and informal) continued expanding. In 1988, prior to trade liberalization and at a time of chronic 
price instability, the Brazilian statistical agency (IBGE) estimated that 13% of GDP was 
generated in the informal or unregistered economy. Within the service economy this proportion 
was estimated as high as 30%, suggesting that the overall estimate may well have been 
conservative (Carneiro, 1997). 
 
  The achievement of macroeconomic stability in Brazil that followed the successful 
adoption of the Plano Real in 1994 might have removed some of the pressure for economic 
activity to migrate into the informal sector. On the other hand trade liberalization in the early 
1990s increased competitive pressures in the tradable sectors of the economy. But recent 
research finds little or no relationship in Brazil between trade liberalization and informal 
employment, defined according to labor contract status (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003). 
Furthermore constitutional reform in 1988 may have simultaneously decreased flexibility in the 
formal labor market (Barros and Corseuil, 2001). So the emerging pattern of development in the 
informal sector may be complex. 
   13
  Regulation of the labor market in Brazil can be traced back to the enactment of the Labor 
Code of 1943. This mandates official registration of all contracts of employment through the 
requirement of employers to provide a signed labor card (“carteira de trabalho assinada”). The 
card contains a statement of the terms of employment to all employees. Registration of a labor 
contract confers a legal entitlement to a range of contract terms including a maximum working 
week (currently 44 hours), paid vacations, maternity leave, due notice of dismissal (proportional 
to seniority)
5, a minimum overtime premium and an entitlement to compensation in the event of 
a non-justified dismissal. Dismissal compensation is paid from the Fundo de Garantia por Tempo 
de Serviço (FGTS) accumulated by every worker with a signed labor card. The employer 
contributes an amount equivalent to 8% of the employee’s current monthly wage. The employee 
receives a penalty of 40% of the employer’s cumulative contribution in the event of dismissal 
without just cause. This penalty was increased from 10% by the 1988 Constitution. As Barros 
and Corseuil (2001) note the effect of the change was to reduce the length of tenure needed to 
accumulate a compensation amount equal to one month’s salary from at least 10 years to only 
two and a half years. At face value this would appear to amount to a substantial increase in 
employer firing costs, although in practice it creates the potential for collusion between 
employers and employees to register voluntary quits as dismissals. Thus it creates an incentive to 
quit on the part of employees. Barros and Corseuil (2001) and Camargo (2002) cite evidence in 
support of this. In short there may be a strong disincentive for employers to register contracts, 
but, once registered, employers and employees face incentives which increase turnover. 
 
  Social protection beyond dismissal compensation in Brazil is provided through individual 
employee membership of a social security institute (Instituto de Previdência). Protected workers   14
pay monthly contributions on a graduated scale up to a ceiling of 11 per cent, with employers 
contributing a further 20% of payroll. Membership of an institute provides defined benefit 
pension provision (up to an upper ceiling), permanent disability benefits and life insurance 
(survivor) benefits. Workers without social security institute membership qualify for a meager 
flat rate old age pension equal to the minimum wage. 
 
  Our investigation of informality draws on detailed information contained with the 
Brazilian household survey (PNAD). From 1992 the consistent questionnaire structure adopted 
by the survey allows separate identification of contract registration (labor card) and social 
protection across an individual’s main and supplementary jobs, alongside detailed information on 
the type of employment and the size and activity of the business. Surveys were conducted 
annually with the exception of 1994 (because of austerity associated with the introduction of the 
Plano Real) and 2000 (the year of the decennial census).  
 
Table 1 reports summary information on economic activity in main employment for all 
workers aged between 18 and 65 for each available year. All descriptive analysis makes use of 
individual sample weights provided by IBGE. In any year just over half of the economically 
active are engaged in paid employment. This proportion seems quite stable although there is 
some evidence of an upturn in the proportion towards the very end of the period. However the 
proportion of public sector workers, who by definition have registered contracts, falls from 
27.4% of employees in 1992 to 23.6% in 2001. The next largest group are the self-employed 
(own-account workers), comprising almost of quarter of the economically active. A further four 
percent are entrepreneurs employing others. There is some slight evidence that employers as a   15
proportion of the total have risen over the period, but no discernable trend in the proportion of 
the self-employed. A further 1.1% of the overall total, in 1992, are individuals whose main status 
is as an employee, but have self-employed or employer status in a second activity. This figure 
drops slightly to 0.95% in 2001. Thus in 1992 28.4% of economically active adults could be 
regarded as engaged in some broad form of entrepreneurial activity, either as main or secondary 
activity. This total remains virtually unchanged at 28.3% in 2001. So overall these data appear to 
offer little support for rising entrepreneurialism.  
 
The fastest growing group as a proportion of the total is domestic workers, rising from 
6.2% in 1992 to 7.8% in 2001. This is an employment group traditionally associated with 
informality, although as we shall see there should be no automatic presumption that domestic 
workers are unregistered and unprotected. Increasing employment of domestic staff may reflect 
rising standards of living in Brazil, particularly amongst upper and middle earners. The data 
allow the identification of three further categories of employment, each of which may be 
regarded as informal: non-remunerated employment (typically in a family business), subsistence 
agricultural workers and temporary workers. As a proportion of the total each if these is small. 
For each proportion there is some evidence of a downward trend. 
 
  In order to assess the possible size of the informal sector we adopt three different 
definitions to distinguish formality and informality. 
 
A (contract status): a worker is defined as formal is they have a signed labor card in any 
employment. Through its questionnaire routing the PNAD regards all public sector employees as   16
having signed labor cards. Those who are self-employed or employers in their main occupation 
are classified as formal if they have a signed labor card from another paid second job. 
 
B (social security status): a worker is defined as formal if they make contributions to a social 
security institute (federal, state or municipal) in respect of any employment. The PNAD asks all 
workers regardless of economic status or sector if they make social security contributions. 
 
C (formal activity): a worker is defined as formal if they are employed in an establishment of 
more than five employees. The self-employed and employers are defined as formal if their 
occupation is “creative and technical” or “administrative” (to capture “professional” activities). 
All domestic, non-remunerated, subsistence and temporary workers are defined as informal, 
along with all the self-employed and employers in occupations other than “creative and 
technical” and “administrative”. 
 
4. Variation in Informality in Brazil 
 
  Table 2 details the proportions of workers classified as informal under each definition 
according to economic status. Definition A based on contract status provides the largest estimate 
of the size of informal employment, at between 56 and 58 per cent of all workers. The smallest 
estimate at around 50% is provided by definition C, in which workers are categorized according 
to establishment size and occupation. Definition B based on social security status provides an 
estimate of informal employment at just over 50%. There is no discernable trend in any of the 
three definitions.    17
 
Once the data are sub-divided by economic status, wider variation between the 
definitions is apparent. Turning first to employees, definition C continues to provide the smallest 
estimate of informal employment at below 20%, but definition B (social security membership) 
now provides the largest estimate at between 24 and 28%. For all three definitions there is some 
evidence of an upward trend in informality. This is most pronounced for definition C, where 
informality rises from 12.8% in 1993 to 16.6% in 2001.  
 
For the self-employed only those whose main job is as a registered employee are 
recorded as formal under definition A, and only those who business activity falls under the two 
professional occupational categories are classified as formal under definition C. Informal self-
employment activity under definition C is falling slightly. Informality declines from 95.5% to 
93.0% over the period. Under definition B (no social security protection) less than 80% of the 
self-employed are informal in 1992. Here there is a clear upward trend. The proportion rises to 
over 84% by 2001. 
 
For employers only those few with registered main jobs are classified as formal under 
definition A. So rates of informality defined by lack of a signed labor card are very high. One 
third of employers have no social security protection in 1992. This proportion remains at the 
same level until 1997 when it starts to rise quickly. Under definition C very few employers are 
classified as informal. In fact up to 1993 the occupational classification defines all employers as 
“creative and technical” or “administrative”. From 1997 onwards the informal proportion starts 
to rise. The remaining four groups in Table 2 are all entirely classified as informal under   18
definition C. A significant minority of domestic workers and, to a lesser extent, temporary 
workers have registered contracts and/or make social security payments. For both groups the 
proportions which are defined as informal are falling. The proportion of domestic workers with a 
no signed labor card falls from 79 percent in 1992 to 72 per cent in 2001, and those with no 
social security coverage from 77 percent to 69 percent. 
 
In summary Table 2 reveals some significant differences both between the different 
definitions we have constructed, and between the experiences of different types of workers. For 
employees the level of informality is stable, despite the relative decline of public sector 
employment. For entrepreneurial groups (the self-employed and employers) informality if 
defined by social security status is increasing. However, if informality is defined according to the 
nature of the activity, it is falling amongst the self-employed. Informality amongst domestic and 
temporary workers is also falling. 
 
The other feature in Table 2 is that there is incomplete overlap between the different 
definitions, and for some groups the overlap may be quite limited. In particular the definitions of 
informality based on contract and social security status (A and B) may distinguish very different 
groups of workers compared to the definition based on activity (definition C). Table 3 reports 
pairwise correlation coefficients for the three measures. Definitions A and B have a correlation 
of around 0.8 suggesting a reasonably high, although far from complete, correspondence 
between the two measures. Definition C has a lower correlation with the other two measures, and 
particularly with social security status. Figures 1 and 2 explore this point further by providing 
Venn diagrams to show the correspondence of the three measures across the full sample of the   19
economically active for 1992 and 2001. In both years just under 40 percent of the sample can be 
defined as informal on all three definitions. Just over 36 percent of the sample in both years can 
be classified as formal on all three definitions. A total of 13.4% of the sample in 1992 and 12.9% 
in 2001 can be classified as informal on any two of the three definitions. In particular there is a 
significant proportion of workers classified as informal on the basis of having no signed labor 
card and no social security coverage but who fall into the formal category under definition C. A 
total of 9.9% of the sample in 1992 and 11.0% in 2001 fall into one of the definitions of 
informality but neither of the other two. The largest element of this group, particularly in 2001, is 
those who are classified as informal on the basis of activity but have a signed labor card and 
social protection. Domestic and temporary workers form a significant element of this group. 
 
Table 4 reveals the different position of men and women. Across all three definitions 
informality is increasing amongst men and falling amongst women. The upward trend for men is 
most pronounced for definition C, to the extent that by 2001 the estimate of male informality on 
the basis of activity is within 1.2 percentage points of the estimate on the basis of social security 
coverage. For women the decline in informality is steepest for definition B. There is very little 
trend in female informality defined by activity. Notice also that there is a difference in the 
orderings of the estimates for men and for women. Male informality is highest when defined by 
contract status (no signed labor card) and lowest when defined by activity. Female informality is 
highest when defined by contract status at the beginning of the period but by 2001 is highest 
when defined by activity. It is lowest when defined by social security status. So Brazil has had 
enjoyed some success in improving social security participation amongst women, but this has 
been partially at the expense of the worsening position of men. There has been a change in the   20
composition of informal activity towards men, partially offset by women moving into formal 
activity, as well as a shift in the composition of those without registered contracts towards men. 
This last shift has been to such an extent that by 2001 men are more likely than women not to 
have a registered contract. 
 
Table 5 reveals that informality is very strongly associated with educational attainment. 
Rates of over 80% are observed for the illiterate. These fall to around a quarter for college 
graduates. Rates of informality are rising amongst the lower level groups (illiterate and 
elementary), but against a background of these groups falling fast as a proportion of the total 
active population. Informality is rising quickly amongst secondary school and college graduates 
on all three definitions. The reason why informality is rising for many educational sub-groups, 
although stable for the population as a whole, is because of the relatively stable level of 
informality amongst the illiterate and elementary groups who are declining rapidly as a 
proportion of the population. Absolute numbers of uneducated or poorly educated informal 
workers are falling fast in Brazil. This overall pattern is common to all three informality 
definitions. However there are differences in the levels of informality for particular educational 
groups according to definition. Rates of informality amongst the illiterate are lower for definition 
C than for A and B. On the other hand rates of informality, defined by no signed labor card, are 
higher amongst secondary and college educated groups than for the other two definitions. 
 
Rates of informality in establishments of different sizes according to each definition are 
given in Table 6.  By definition those working in larger establishments (6 or more employees) 
are classified as formal according to definition C. Amongst sole-traders informality has risen   21
significantly when defined by social security institute membership (mirroring the picture in 
Table 2), but is stable for the other two definitions. For those in very small establishments, that is 
two or 3 to 5 employees, informality has fallen slightly according to definition A but risen 
according to definition B and, in particular, definition C. Rates of informality defined by contract 
or social security status have also risen significantly in larger (11+ employee) establishments. 
These larger establishments employ almost 50% of the workforce. Informality is high amongst 
those who do not know their establishment size. Lack of information here may correlate with 
poor educational attainment.  In summary Table 7 suggests that informality is increasing in large 
establishments whereas (in terms of contract status) it is falling in the smallest establishments, 
and is stable in the middle (establishments with 6 to 10 employees).  
 
Table 7 describes rates of informality according to occupation. The occupational 
breakdown is a broad classification of eight sectors. Rates of informality vary considerably by 
occupational groups. Informality is high in agricultural, retailing and distribution occupations, 
and in domestic, personal and catering services groups. It is low in the creative and technical, 
administrative, and transport and communications groups. Alternative definitions of informality 
provide in some cases very different pictures of informality by occupational group. Since the 
self-employed in the creative and technical group are defined according to definition C as 
formal, then rates of informality according to this definition are very low. Yet it is apparent that 
numbers without signed labor cards or social security institute membership are much higher and 
rising over time. In retailing and distribution informality defined according to social security 
protection is significantly lower than according to the other two definitions. To a lesser extent the 
same holds for transport and communications occupations. In this sector informality is rising fast   22
according to all three definitions. Informality as measured by definitions A and B is falling in 
domestic, personal and catering occupations. It is also falling in retailing and distribution. Both 
of these sectors are growing as a proportion of total employment. 
 
5. Multivariate analysis of factors associated with informality 
 
  Although we have been able to point to differences and similarities between key 
demographic variables and different definitions of informality, we can say nothing so far about 
any conditional association between these. This section presents estimates of the marginal effects 
of different potential influences on the likelihood of informality obtained from probit 
regressions. The specification of each regression includes individual demographic information, 
information on the geographical situation of the individual, information on the nature of the 
employment and information on the economic status of the remainder of the individual’s family. 
Included under the heading of demographic information are a quadratic function of the 
individual’s age and binary indicators for gender and ethnicity (reference category: white male). 
Indicators of illiteracy and educational attainment are also included (reference category: 
education to elementary level).
6 Two aspects of geographical situation are included. The first is a 
set of broad regional indicators, defined so that the heavily urbanized and industrialized region of 
the South East is the reference category. Given that some previous research identifies informality 
with urbanization, the second is a binary indicator for residence in an urban location. The urban 
indicator is a variable derived by the IBGE statistical agency from household address records and 
corresponds to residence in cities, towns and so-called isolated urban areas. 
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  Three aspects of the nature of the individual’s employment are included. A binary 
indicator of unionization is included to capture a likely association between collective 
representation and formality. It is important to uncover the extent to which definitions of 
informality based on contract and social security status identify individuals predominantly in 
small establishments. So information on the size of the establishment, in the form of a binary 
indicator for greater than 11 employees is included for regressions to explain definitions A and 
B. (Since definition C is partly based on establishment size it is not appropriate to include it as an 
explanatory factor.) Indicators of broad occupational grouping are included to assess the extent 
to which there may be certain occupational sectors in which employment tends inherently to be 
less formal. The reference occupation here is a residual category denoted “other”. It includes a 
range of occupations in the extractive and public (including defense) sectors. 
 
  Turning to indicators of the economic status of the rest of the family, the first inclusion is 
a binary indicator for the informal status of the individual’s spouse conditional on being married 
and economically active. Spousal informality is defined throughout according to definition A for 
consistently and comparability. We hold no prior hypothesis here. Having a spouse without a 
registered contract may create a greater incentive to acquire the protection of a formal sector job. 
On the other hand informal workers may be simply more likely, as a result of a marriage 
matching process, to have informal sector spouses. For the same reasons the total number of 
formal employees in the family (i.e. with signed labor cards) is included, as well as the total 
number of self-employed in the family. The presence of dependents within the family may also 
influence individual employment decisions or options. So the totals of elderly (i.e. aged 65 and 
over) and children in the family are included. Finally other family earnings per head is included.   24
This is an indicator of the extent to which the individual workers may rely on income generated 
elsewhere in the family as an alternative to social protection. 
 
  Table 8 reports estimated marginal effects for each year for definition A (no signed labor 
card). Threshold levels of statistical significance are indicated – full results are available on 
request. In general most of the explanatory factors included in the regressions attract statistical 
significance although there is considerable variation in the importance of particular associations, 
as indicated by the size of the marginal effects. There is a U-shaped relationship between 
informality and age. The age at which an individual is most likely to have a signed labor card is 
in their late 20s, other things equal. Women are 5 percentage points less likely to be informal 
than men, other things equal. Indigenous and Asian ethnic groups appear more likely to be 
informal than whites, and blacks less so. However those of mixed race (the largest non-white 
group) are no more or less likely than whites to be informal. Illiteracy is positively associated 
with informality, but only by 6 to 9 percentage points. The marginal effects for the various 
educational attainment levels do not suggest any qualitatively strong relationship between 
schooling and informal status. In particular college (first degree) graduates appear no less likely 
to have a signed labor card than those with only basic schooling, other things equal. 
 
  The reported marginal effects for the four regions show that informality is higher outside 
the South East, and in particular in the North and the North East. However these regional 
differences appear to be in decline. Urban residents are only slightly less likely to be informal 
than those in rural areas. On the basis of definition A there is no reason to view informality as a 
predominantly urban phenomenon. The lack of a signed contract is strongly associated with   25
absence of union representation and with small establishment size. But there is some evidence in 
the results to suggest that the association with small establishments is also in decline. There is 
also a strong occupational pattern to the lack of a signed contract, although once again these 
effects are declining quite significantly over time. Informality as defined here is strongest 
amongst agricultural, production, construction, retailing and distribution occupations. 
 
  Informal status defined on the basis of contract appears to be weakly complementary with 
informality elsewhere in the family. If workers have a spouse who is working without a signed 
labor card then they are 2 to 4 percentage points more likely to be informal themselves. Similarly 
an increase in the number of formal workers in the family as a whole is associated with a lower 
likelihood of informality, at a similar order of magnitude. Self-employment activity elsewhere in 
the family is strongly positively associated with informal contract status. The presence of elderly 
and children slightly but statistically significantly reduces the likelihood of informal contract 
status. Higher other family earnings are negatively associated with informality in 1992, but by 
1995 are positively associated and remain so until the end of the period in question. There is 
some evidence that this positive association grows in size. 
 
  Table 9 reports exactly the same regression specifications for the definition B (no social 
protection). There are some pronounced differences between these results and those reported in 
Table 8. The age at which an individual worker is least likely to be informal now increases to the 
early to mid 40s. Women are now more likely to be informal. Mixed race individuals are 
significantly more likely than whites to be informal, although the marginal effect indicates that 
the difference is only between 2 and 4 percentage points. There is now a much stronger negative   26
association between higher educational status and informality. This negative association appears 
to become stronger towards the end of the period. Urban residents are less likely to be informal 
and the marginal effects are at least twice as large as those in Table 8. Union status and 
employment in a large establishment remain quantitatively very important, although the negative 
marginal effect for being with a large employer falls from over 60 percentage points to around 
46-47 percentage points. By 2001 the patterns of occupational coefficients are different from 
those in Table 8. Although agricultural occupations remain far more likely to be informal, the 
strong positive effects seen for production, construction, retail, distribution and communications 
are diminished. Under definition B those in administrative occupations are significantly and 
quantitatively less likely to be informal. Turning to the variables describing the economic status 
of the family, we observe that the size of the positive relationship with the number of self-
employed is the family falls substantially and that the associations with family dependents and 
other family income cease to be significant. 
 
  Table 10 reports the results for the definition C based on establishment size and activity. 
Age remains significantly associated with informality – the age at which informality is least 
likely is around 30 years, closer to that for definition A than for B. Being female is positively 
associated with informality – women are 4 to 6 percentage points more likely to be in an 
informal activity. There is however virtually no significant association between ethnicity and this 
definition of informality. The association between educational attainment and this definition of 
informality is, from the pattern of the marginal effects, the most clear of any of the three 
definitions. Illiteracy is associated with an increase in the probability of informality of between 2 
and 7 percentage points, with clear evidence that the conditional impact is rising over time. On   27
the other hand the possession of a college degree reduces the likelihood of this definition of 
informality by between 14 and 17 percentage points. 
 
  Again there appears to be a regional pattern to informality, once other factors are held. 
But the marginal effects are in general much smaller than for the other two definitions. There is 
barely any relationship with urban residence. Geography seems to matter much less if 
informality is defined according to the characteristics of the employment. Marginal effects for 
occupation remain statistically significant. However the negative coefficients for creative and 
technical and administrative occupations in part arise from the exclusion of all the self-employed 
in these sectors from this definition of informality. Similarly the strong positive association with 
the domestic, personal and catering services sector arises in part from the inclusion of all 
domestic workers in this definition of informality. 
 
  The likelihood of being in an informal activity is reduced if the worker’s spouse is 
informal, although by only a very small amount. However the sign of this relationship is the 
opposite of that observed for the other two definitions. Self-employment elsewhere in the family 
is strongly positively associated with this definition of informality. Marginal effects are three 
times as large as for definition B and nearer in size to those for definition A. Similarly the 
negative association between informality and numbers of dependents in the family is similar to 
that observed for definition A. There is a weak negative association between informal activity 
and other household income, which is only statistically significant in two of the eight years. This 
pattern of marginal effects is closest to those for definition B. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
  There is no consensus on how to define the phenomenon of labor market informality in 
developing economies. In many cases researchers’ choice of definition is determined by the 
availability of data. There has been only cursory discussion in the literature on whether this 
matters. We conclude in this paper that it does. Using data from Brazilian household surveys we 
have constructed three alternative definitions of informality, which attempt to reflect the various 
alternatives used in the literature. Informality is defined according to employment contract status, 
according to social security protection and, in a manner which is often adopted in previous 
research, according the nature of the employment and the characteristics of the employer. These 
three definitions are far from observationally equivalent. Around 64% of all the economically 
active in Brazil are informal according to at least one of the three definitions, but only 40% are 
informal according to all three definitions. There is a closer correspondence between informality 
defined by not having a registered employment contract and not contributing to a social security 
scheme. However substantial numbers of workers are classified as informal if the definition is 
based on the nature of the employment and the employer, even though they may have registered 
contracts and/or may contribute towards social security. 
 
  Even though overall rates of informality appear constant in Brazil through the 1990s, 
steady compositional changes are taking place. More women are becoming formal, while men 
are becoming more informal. Rates of informality are falling among the least skilled (as they 
decline in importance as a group) while rates of informality are rising quickly among the most 
skilled (as they increase in importance as a group). There are also occupational changes at work.   29
Informality is rising among “higher” occupations and amongst manufacturing and construction 
groups, whereas it is falling among some service occupations, such as shop-workers and 
domestic staff. The scale of these changes is dependent on choice of definition. These changes 
are mirrored in the econometric analysis presented in the paper, as the changing pattern of 
marginal effects on the likelihood of informality reveals growing heterogeneity within the 
informal sector. 
 
  However the most important conclusion to emerge from econometric analysis is that the 
conditional impact of particular factors on the likelihood of informality varies considerably from 
one definition to another. Informality defined according to contract status (labor card) is far less 
strongly associated with lower educational attainment than it is for the other definitions, in 
particular the third definition (activity). There are also important differences in the occupational 
profile of the informal sector between the definitions. For example “higher level” occupations 
may not have a registered contract, perhaps because they are self-employed or employers, but 
they do seem to have social protection. Lack of social protection seems to be a rural 
phenomenon, whereas there is little or no relationship between urban/rural location and the other 
definitions of informality. The security offered by a registered contract or a large employer 
seems better to match the family circumstances of those with dependents, but family 
circumstances do not appear to be strongly associated with social protection. Informal contract 
status (definition A) and informal activity (definition C) are strongly positively associated with 
informality elsewhere in the family, especially self-employment. This is not the case for social 
security status. 
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  Each of these points merits further research. In particular these differences suggest that 
the focus of research should shift towards the particular investigation of why workers choose not 
to have social protection. On the other hand a different avenue of research should focus on the 
relationship between entrepreneurial activity and informality. Our third definition of informality, 
based on the characteristics of the employment and the employer, is in empirical terms the most 
arbitrary. Yet this definition is conceptually well-founded as it corresponds most closely with the 
notion that informality is related to the degree of entrepreneurial dynamism in a developing 
economy. There is no a priori reason for believing that such employment activity should of 
necessity by unregistered and unprotected, and should therefore be regarded as “inferior”. The 
other strong feature of the data investigated in this paper concerns the growing heterogeneity 
within the informal sector. The reasons why males and those with high levels of educational 
attainment seem increasingly likely to be found working without contract registration or social 
protection, or in “informal activity”, merit substantial further analysis.    31
Notes: 
                                                 
1 For further discussion on modeling and testing for segmentation see Heckman and Sedlacek 
(1985) and Magnac (1991). 
2 Loayza et al. (2005) argue that a heavier regulatory burden, particularly in product and labor 
markets, reduces growth and induces informality. They conclude, however, that these effects can 
be mitigated as the overall institutional framework improves. 
3 Informal workers defined as all non-professional self-employed plus all other employees of 
firms with under five employees (four in the case of El Salvador). 
4 Gong et al. (2000) report alternative results based on the firm-size definition in an appendix, 
but these are omitted from the version of this work subsequently published as Gong and van 
Soest (2002). The two sets of results are described in the later paper as “qualitatively similar”. 
No results are reported for a definition based on social security coverage. 
5 Prior to the adoption of the 1988 Constitution dismissal notice was fixed at one month. 
Subsequently it is a minimum of one month rising proportionately with accumulated tenure with 
the employer. This change is one of the main reasons why Barros and Corseuil (2001) argue that 
labor market inflexibility may have increased in Brazil. 
6 The structure of the PNAD questionnaire assumes that those who are illiterate must not have 
received any formal schooling.   32
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Table 1: Employment Status – 18-65 year olds 
 
Employment status – main 
occupation % 
1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 
Employees  52.6 52.8 51.4 53.2 52.2 52.7 51.7 54.1 
Self-employed  sole  traders  23.2 23.2 24.1 23.6 23.9 24.1 24.1 22.9 
Employers  4.1 3.9 4.3 4.0 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.4 
Domestic  workers  6.2 6.4 7.1 7.1 7.4 7.1 7.5 7.8 
Non-remunerated  workers  6.5 6.6 6.3 5.9 5.8 5.6 6.1 5.0 
Subsistence agricultural  4.4 4.3 4.1 3.7 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.2 
Temporary  workers  3.1 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.6 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: authors’ computations from PNAD, population weights 
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Table 2: Labor card and social security institute status (in any employment) and informal activity by main employment status 
 
%  1992  1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 
All economically active 
  A. No signed labor card 
  B. No SS Institute member 


































  A. No signed labor card 
  B. No SS Institute member 

































Self-employed sole traders 
  A. No signed labor card 
  B. No SS Institute member 


































  A. No signed labor card 
  B. No SS Institute member 
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  A. Signed labor card 
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  A. No signed labor card 

























Source: authors’ computations from PNAD, population weights   36
Table 3: Correlations of informality measures 
 
  A: No signed 
labor card 





1992:     
A: No signed labor card  1     
B: No SS Institute membership  0.79  1   
C: Informal activity  0.68  0.60  1 
2001:     
A: No signed labor card  1     
B: No SS Institute membership  0.84  1   
C: Informal activity  0.67  0.58  1 
 
 
Source: authors’ computations from PNAD, population weights   37
Table 4: Descriptive analysis by informality definition - gender 
 
%  1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 
Male 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 


































A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 

































t-test for difference between 
men and women 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 










































Note: ** denotes p<0.01 
Source: authors’ computations from PNAD, population weights   38
 Table 5: Descriptive analysis by informality definition – educational attainment 
 
%  1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 
All educational levels* 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 

































Illiterate (1992: 10.6%; 2001: 6.5%) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 

































Elementary (1992: 27.4%; 2001: 15.5%) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 

































Primary (1992: 34.7%; 2001: 38.7%) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 

































Secondary (1992: 17.5%; 2001: 26.2%) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 

































College deg. (1992: 9.1%; 2001: 12.3%) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 

































Postgrad deg. (1992: 0.4%; 2001: 0.8%) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 
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Note: * Observations with missing information on educational attainment comprise 1.44% and 1.39% of the total sample in 1992 and 
2001 respectively. 
Source: authors’ computations from PNAD, population weights   40
Table 6: Descriptive analysis by informality definition – establishment size (excluding agriculture*) 
 
%  1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 
One (1992: 22.5%; 2001 22.8%: ) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 

































Two (1992:  3.6%; 2001: 4.3%) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 

































3 to 5 (1992: 7.4%; 2001: 8.7%) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 

































6 to 10 (1992: 5.9% ; 2001: 7.1) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 

































11 or more (1992: 49.8%; 2001: 
45.2% ) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 

































Establishment size unknown (1992: 
10.8%; 2001: 11.8%) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 










































Note: *Agriculture is omitted because the questionnaire schedule for agricultural workers is subdivided into grouped responses for 
temporary and permanent workers. 
Source: authors’ computations from PNAD, population weights   41
Table 7: Descriptive analysis by informality definition – occupational sector 
 
%  1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 
Creative and Technical  
(1992: 8.1%; 2001: 9.5%) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 










































(1992: 14.0%; 2001: 13.4%) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 










































(1992: 23.2%; 2001: 17.2%) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 









































Manufacturing and construction  
(1992: 18.9%; 2001: 19.1%) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 









































Retail and Distribution  
(1992: 11.0%; 2001: 12.6%) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 









































Transport and Communications  
(1992: 4.2%; 2001: 4.5%) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 
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Domestic, Personal and Catering 
Services (1992: 9.7%; 2001: 1.9%) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 











































(1992: 10.9%; 2001: 12.0%) 
A: no signed labor card 
B: no SS membership 










































Source: authors’ computations from PNAD, population weights 
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Table 8: Probit Estimates – No Signed Labor Card 
 
  1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 
Age  -0.007** -0.009** -0.005** -0.008** -0.007** -0.011** -0.011** -0.012** 
Age  squared  0.00013** 0.00016** 0.00011** 0.00015** 0.00014** 0.00019** 0.00018** 0.00021** 
Female  -0.053** -0.050** -0.059** -0.060** -0.073** -0.063** -0.070** -0.061** 













































Illiterate  0.059** 0.071** 0.072** 0.074** 0.068** 0.053** 0.070** 0.088** 
Schooling (reference: Elementary) 
 Primary 
 Secondary 
 College  degree 









































Region (reference: South East) 
 North 
 Centre  East 
 South 









































Urban resident  -0.049**  -0.015*  -0.041**  -0.022**  -0.036**  0.004  0.0003  -0.030** 
Union  member  -0.236** -0.232** -0.242** -0.233** -0.250** -0.245** -0.249** -0.231** 
Establishment  >  11  employees  -0.675** -0.671** -0.661** -0.627** -0.633** -0.630** -0.627** -0.616** 
Occupation (reference: Other) 
 Creative  and  technical 
 Administrative 
 Agricultural 
  Production and construction 
 Retail  and  distribution 
 Transport  and  comms 

































































0.100**   44
Spouse  working  with  no  labor  card  0.037** 0.022** 0.025** 0.025** 0.021** 0.022** 0.014** 0.031** 
Family  total  with  labor  cards  -0.026** -0.025** -0.027** -0.028** -0.025** -0.032** -0.027** -0.025** 
Family  total  self-employed  0.139** 0.139** 0.147** 0.159** 0.155** 0.148** 0.152** 0.140** 
Family  total  number  of  children  -0.010** -0.010** -0.014** -0.011** -0.011** -0.010** -0.011** -0.011** 
Family  total  number  over  65  -0.025** -0.022** -0.018** -0.026** -0.020** -0.022** -0.020** -0.018** 









          
Sample  size  103,700 105,031 112,127 108,924 116,120 115,011 118,767 132,534 
Log  likelihood  -35275.7 -36438.4 -39000.0 -40349.0 -42835.6 -43755.5 -45398.1 -52032.1 
 
Note: reported coefficients are marginal effects (which in the case of binary variables are for a discrete change in the variable) 
* denotes p<0.05; ** denotes p<0.01;  
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Table 9: Probit Estimates – No Social Security Membership 
 
  1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 
Age  -0.028** -0.028** -0.025** -0.025** -0.025** -0.026** -0.025** -0.026** 
Age  squared  0.00031** 0.00031** 0.00029** 0.00028** 0.00028**  0.00030*  0.00030*  0.00030* 
Female  0.062** 0.060** 0.050** 0.044** 0.021** 0.026** 0.024** 0.026** 













































Illiterate  0.094** 0.135** 0.098** 0.097** 0.090** 0.115** 0.116** 0.100** 
Schooling (reference: Elementary) 
 Primary 
 Secondary 
 College  degree 









































Region (reference: South East) 
 North 
 Centre  East 
 South 









































Urban  resident  -0.117** -0.126** -0.112** -0.075** -0.098** -0.094** -0.071** -0.089** 
Union  member  -0.241** -0.251** -0.253** -0.248** -0.261** -0.272** -0.267** -0.257** 
Establishment  >  11  employees  -0.474** -0.469** -0.462** -0.419** -0.442** -0.465** -0.464** -0.472** 
Occupation (reference: Other) 
 Creative  and  technical 
 Administrative 
 Agricultural 
  Production and construction 
 Retail  and  distribution 
 Transport  and  comms 

































































0.003   46
Spouse working with no labor card  0.023**  0.012*  0.013**  0.008  0.010*  0.020**  0.006  0.020** 
Family  total  with  labor  cards  -0.024** -0.019** -0.025** -0.025** -0.019** -0.030** -0.027** -0.023** 
Family  total  self-employed  0.040** 0.042** 0.052** 0.054** 0.058** 0.064** 0.067** 0.064** 
Family total number of children  0.0006  0.0002  -0.0016*  -0.0014  0.0005  0.0003  -0.0002  -0.0005 
Family  total  number  over  65  -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004  -0.008* 









          
Sample  size  103,687 105,012 112,126 108,918 116,120 115,004 118,763 132,527 
Log  likelihood  -45028.3 -45927.3 -50127.6 -52184.7 -53936.2 -52624.8 -54372.8 -61217.0 
 
Note: reported coefficients are marginal effects (which in the case of binary variables are for a discrete change in the variable) 
* denotes p<0.05; ** denotes p<0.01;   47
Table 10: Probit Estimates – Informal Activity 
 
  1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 
Age  -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.007** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.004** 
Age  squared  0.00010** 0.00010** 0.00010** 0.00012** 0.00010** 0.00010** 0.00011** 0.00009** 
Female  0.065** 0.051** 0.060** 0.057** 0.058** 0.044** 0.045** 0.055** 













































Illiterate  0.024** 0.041** 0.041** 0.028** 0.046** 0.039** 0.052** 0.073** 
Schooling (reference: Elementary) 
 Primary 
 Secondary 
 College  degree 









































Region (reference: South East) 
 North 
 Centre  East 
 South 









































Urban resident  -0.014*  0.006  -0.023**  0.0004  0.0002  0.0002  0.016**  0.006 
Union  member  -0.225** -0.227** -0.252** -0.219** -0.238** -0.229** -0.225** -0.224** 
Establishment  >  11  employees  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Occupation (reference: Other) 
 Creative  and  technical 
 Administrative 
 Agricultural 
  Production and construction 
 Retail  and  distribution 
 Transport  and  comms 

































































0.539**   48
Spouse working with no labor card  -0.007  0.0003  -0.014**  -0.007  -0.014**  -0.015**  -0.022**  -0.008 
Family  total  with  labor  cards  -0.006** -0.006** -0.009** -0.009** -0.013** -0.012** -0.012** -0.008** 
Family  total  self-employed  0.166** 0.176** 0.179** 0.176** 0.181** 0.177** 0.187** 0.164** 
Family  total  number  of  children  -0.019** -0.020** -0.020** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.020** -0.018** 
Family  total  number  over  65  -0.017** -0.023** -0.019** -0.009** -0.024** -0.023** -0.017** -0.011** 









          
Sample  size  103,700 105,031 112,127 108,924 116,120 115,011 118,767 132,534 
Log  likelihood  -44932.5 -44995.1 -48837.2 -49312.3 -51789.7 -51760.3 -53182.6 -60935.2 
 
Note: reported coefficients are marginal effects (which in the case of binary variables are for a discrete change in the variable) 
* denotes p<0.05; ** denotes p<0.01;  
    49
Figure 1: Coincidence of alternative definitions of informality, 1992 
3.53%  8.29%  2.26% 
39.95% 
4.93%  0.18% 
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3.52%  9.23%  1.48% 
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6.01%  36.43% 
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